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RELATIVE MILITARIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON
PUBLIC POLICY BUDGETARY SHIFTS IN
ARGENTINA, 1963-1982

PAUL G. BUCHANAN AND ROBERT LOONEY

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
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
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
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RELATIVE MILITARIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY:

BUDGETARY SHIFTS IN ARGENTINA, 1963-1982

by

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December, 1987

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Relative Militarization and its Impact on Public Policy:

Budgetary Shifts in Argentina, 1963-1982

ABSTRACT

In spite of a growing literature on the subject, analyses of the policy impact of military regimes in Latin America remain inconclusive. Empirical analyses have neither confirmed or denied the proposition that military regimes have a decided, and often negative impact on public policy. In light of that, this essay attempts to test the relatively simple assumption that it is the degree of military control over the state apparatus (i.e. the relative "depth" of militarization), rather than the advent of a military-bureaucratic regime per se, that has the most influence on public policy outputs, here measured in budgetary allocations at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. To accomplish this, we examine central administrative expenditures under the military-bureaucratic regimes that governed Argentina from 1966 to 1973 and 1976 to 1983, and compare them with those of the civilian elected regimes that each displaced. In addition, we examine budgetary allocations to "core" areas of state activity--national health and labor administration--in order to determine whether there are significant policy differences at this level as well. Using this hybrid model, we conclude that, certain contradictions and variances notwithstanding, what is intuitively obvious is confirmed: there is a positive correlation between the "depth" of militarization and budgetary shifts at both levels.

Relative Militarization and its Impact on Public Policy

Budgetary Shifts in Argentina, 1963-1982

I. Introduction

At a theoretical level, the debate over the policy impact of Latin American militarism, and bureaucratic authoritarianism in particular, has essentially concluded. Despite normative differences (such as those between desarrollistas and dependendistas), most analysts now accept the validity of what was long believed to be intuitively obvious: military regimes do have an impact on public policy in Latin America, although on an aggregate level this impact is relatively weak and distributed differently among specific policy areas.(1) This difference is most apparent with regard to political, regulatory, and symbolic policy, particularly as they are expressed in approaches to civil and political rights. By definition, the advent of a military regime entails a drastic restructuring--and narrowing-- of the rules of the political "game." However, in spite of a growing literature on the subject, the evidence with regard to social and economic policy remains inconclusive. While it is generally accepted that in absolute terms military regimes are more prone than civilian regimes to direct public resources towards defense-related concerns (which are often broadly defined, depending on historical and contextual factors), the evidence with regard to overall expenditure levels and the specific amount of resources directed towards other areas of state activity is incomplete and mixed at best. Budgetary analysis remains contradictory: some military regimes spend more on social services and economic development than do some civilian regimes, while others do not. Differences also exist between the spending patterns of military regimes. (Remmer, 1978; Most, 1980; Grindle, 1987; Sloan, 1986; Hughes and



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regimes. (Remmer, 1978; Most, 1980; Grindle, 1987; Sloan, 1986; Hughes and Mijeski, 1984; Hartlyn and Morley, 1986; Looney and Frederikson, 1987). Moreover, the (over) expansion of the state and policy variation in Latin America has been seen as stemming from a form of bureaucratic irrationality based on the political and material insecurities of state managers who are confronted by a wide array of uncertainties at both levels (which in turn derive from the instabilities and uncertainties inherent in the surrounding political environment). Continued bureaucratic expansion in the interest of self-preservation and other organizational pathologies are believed to cross all regime types and national boundaries, and interfere with efficient policy-implementation in each case (Sloan, 1981). "Structural overbureaucratization" and "behavioral underbureaucratization" are believed to conspire against policy implementation under all regimes, and lie at the root of policy shifts and state inefficiency throughout the region (Schmitter, 1971, cited in Sloan, 1981). Likewise, all regimes in Latin America, civilian and military alike, are subject to the constraints imposed by their insertion in the regional and global economic systems. In effect, "socioeconomic conditions impose such basic constraints on political actors that it makes little difference whether they are civilian or military." (Remmer, 1978; p.44) Even so, the underlying question remains. Since political criteria ultimately determine the content of public policy, does not the advent of a military regime signify major shifts in public policy that are evident in budgetary allocations to specific areas of state activity such as the economic management, social services, and interest group administration branches? What is intuitively obvious as of yet lacks empirical confirmation.

As the most modern form of Latin American militarism, bureaucratic authoritarian (BA) regimes are believed to adopt technocratic, efficiency-oriented, and

developmentalist approaches towards the formulation and implementation of public policy (O'Donnell, 1973; O'Donnell and Oszlak, 1976; Collier, 1979; O'Donnell, 1978; Oszlak, 1980; Merkkx and Remmer, 1982). Within the state apparatus, BA regimes adopt pyramidal organizational hierarchies characterized by parallel (most often military) control lines. They undertake a program of rationalization, de-concentration, and subsidarization of functional responsibilities, coupled with an efficiency-based management style (Oszlak and O'Donnell, 1976; Oszlak, 1977; Oszlak, 1980). Financially, BA regimes employ universalistic budgetary schemes governed by authoritarian (noncompetitive) allocation procedures. At the personnel level, there is often a "colonization" of the state apparatus by active or retired military personnel (Oszlak, 1980; Rouquié, 1982). It is believed that the exclusionary (when not repressive) features of these regimes are not only evident in non-allocative areas such as regulatory and symbolic policy, but also in social policy, where the technical justification for the de-emphasis on providing certain types of public goods is attributed to the need for bureaucratic rationalization in areas that had traditionally been sources of waste and inefficiency, something that is believed to have been taken to new extremes by the preceeding civilian regimes (Oszlak, 1980; Canitrot, 1980; Canitrot, 1981). The empirical evidence, however, continues to defy the argument that these regimes have a decided impact on social and economic policy, and that this impact is decidedly different from that of civilian regimes. In a bitter irony, one thing that can be said about these regimes is that they on average performed no better (and in many cases performed much worse) than civilian regimes when pursuing developmentalist goals, even when judged by their own performance standards (Hartlyn and Morley, 1986, esp. Chs.2-3).

Part of the problem of testing assumptions about the impact of military regimes on public policy and resource allocation is due to the continued inability to adequately distinguish between civilian, military, and even bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. The interpenetration of civilian and military roles in Latin America is well known, and has consistently made difficult precise labeling of civilian as opposed to military regimes (Jancowitz, 1977; Remmer, 1978; Simon, 1978; Lowenthal and Fitch, 1986; Grindle, 1987). Similarly, the emphasis on bureaucratic processes of decision-making and technocratic and efficientist orientations has allowed for the identification of a number of regimes as "bureaucratic-authoritarian" despite their varying degrees of militarization. Brazil (1964-1985), Argentina (1966-1973, 1976-1983), Uruguay (1973-1985), Chile (1973-present), Peru (1968-1980), and even the PRI regime in Mexico have been included in this category (Collier, 1979; Merckx and Remmer, 1982). More recently, this label has been attached to regimes outside of Latin America, including those in South Korea (Im, 1987), Turkey (Sunar and Sayari, 1986), and Poland (as Przeworski, 1982, implies). Hence, conceptual imprecision, coupled with the habitual difficulties in obtaining reliable empirical data, may be the root causes of the inability to achieve definitive conclusions about the policy impact of such regimes.

One area in the literature on modern authoritarian regimes upon which there is relatively little disagreement is the structure of the state under these types of regime. In early writings, O'Donnell referred to BA states as opposed to BA regimes (O'Donnell, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1978; 1979), something which was accepted by some (Sloan, 1981) and criticized at length by others (Cardoso, 1979; Stepan, 1980; Merckx and Remmer, 1982). In his later writings on the subject, O'Donnell at least partially concedes the point, and places more emphasis on the

political, social, and economic objectives of regimes rather than on the structure of the state itself (O'Donnell, 1982). The important point is that under a wide variety of authoritarian regimes, and despite their varying ideological foundations and policy objectives in a range of functional areas, the state is characterized by the bureaucratic and technocratic orientations mentioned above. Contrary to democratic states, in which concession and compromise are major ingredients of the policy-making process, and thus strongly influence the organization of the state apparatus, these types of state seriously limit the amount and type of inputs afforded civil society in that process, something that is manifest in the organization of the state apparatus. It is the top-down, elitist, unresponsive, and heavily centralized structure of these states, in other words, that distinguishes them from other types of state. Yet, as we shall see, the extent to which the state achieves organizational "insulation" varies from authoritarian regime to authoritarian regime, which adds to the confusion regarding the policy impact of these regime types. It is here where the issue of relative levels of militarization becomes relevant, because it is the degree of military control over the state apparatus that serves as one of the distinguishing characteristics between authoritarian regimes, something which should have an impact at the level of public policy.

In order to clarify the discussion of regime type so as to better assess their impact on public policy, we propose to follow Cordoso (1979) and define military-bureaucratic regimes according to the degree of direct military control over the state apparatus rather than on their ideological, political, economic and bureaucratic-technocratic orientations per se. The extent to which control of the state apparatus under a particular military-bureaucratic regime is assumed by active duty military personnel--that is, the military as a corpora-

tion--is here considered to reflect a "deepening" of military control that should be strongly evident at the level of public policy. This relative "depth" allows us to look beyond civil-military coalitions and procedural incumbents (government leaders) and into the state--the instrument responsible for formulating and implementing public policy--in order to determine if the regime is in fact militarized. If theory holds true, the greater the militarization of the state apparatus, greater should be the difference with respect to the policies and resource allocation procedures of civilian regimes. While it may be true that control of the state leads to further politicization of the military, the important point is that as political actors the degree of control over the state apparatus afforded the military in such instances is far superior to that of any elected government, something which should be reflected at the level of policy outputs. More specifically, the depth of militarization of the state parallels the degree of exclusion from decision-making spheres to which opposition groups are subjected. The narrower the regime's support base, greater is the exclusion of other social groups.

Deepening of militarization generally occurs in response to the severity of the political crisis that precipitated the military's assumption of power (O'Donnell, 1978). The deeper the previous crisis and the higher the level of threat perceived by the military hierarchy and its civilian allies, greater is the exclusion of those groups that the regime holds accountable for the crisis, or which it believes could threaten the achievement of regime objectives. Hence, depending on the nature of the preceeding crisis, deeper will be the degree of militarization in state agencies that are responsible for carrying out exclusionary policies. This should have a measurable impact on state performance, particularly in policy areas that directly affect perceived opposition

groups. Here we do not assign significant weight to the ideological content of a specific regime's project, but to policy shifts (measured in budgetary allocations) that result after it assumes power. Even so, it is necessary to describe the socioeconomic and political outlook of the regime, as well as the circumstances of its assumption, in order to understand the background to these policy shifts. This permits us to avoid the ahistorical determinism that characterizes much of the empirical literature (See for example Schmidt, 1986).

So as to test the hypothesis that the depth of militarization influences the policy output of military-bureaucratic regimes, we have selected as subjects of study the military regimes that governed Argentina from 1966 to 1973 and 1976 to 1983. For comparative purposes we have included economic data on state expenditures from 1961 to 1982, with emphasis on the two civilian regimes that alternated power with them in 1963-1966 and 1973-1976, plus a more long term budgetary picture in two core areas of state activity. The reasons for this choice are two-fold. On one hand, modern Argentina represents an excellent example of a country beset by chronic political instability and frequent, irregular, and unpredictable succession between civilian and military regimes, something that should be empirically evident in both macro and micro variations in public policy indicators. On the other hand, the two regimes represent archtypical case studies of military bureaucratic authoritarianism sequentially located in the same national context. In fact, the "Revolución Argentina" of 1966-1973 provided the first study of such a regime type (O'Donnell, 1973, 1982), while the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" of 1976-1983 represents a refinement of the theme that allows us to test the "deepening" hypothesis within the same national boundaries (Rouquié, 1983; Oszlak, 1985). Analysis of macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators in core areas of state activity under

each regime should allow us to diachronically compare data over time and across civilian and military regime types (to test the validity of the standard civilian-military dichotomy), and more importantly, to measure the impact different levels of militarization have on public policy outputs under the two military regimes. By doing so, we expect to demonstrate not only the validity of the standard hypothesis, but also that the depth of militarization of the state apparatus is correlated with variations in certain policy indicators, specifically budgetary distributions at both the macroeconomic level within the state (i.e., in the general provision of public goods), and at the microeconomic level within specific core areas of state activity, in this case national health and labor administration. We also thereby avoid the methodological difficulties involved with cross-national comparisons that have plagued the empirical literature (Remmer, 1978).

II. Military-Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Argentina, 1966-1973, 1976-1983.

The "Revolución Argentina" and the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" represent successive attempts by the armed forces hierarchy and their civilian allies to put an end to the cycle of political strife, economic deterioration, and increased social disorder that had marked Argentina after 1946. To accomplish this, both regimes proposed to eliminate Peronism as a political force, since the levels of working class and lower middle class mobilization prompted by the emergence of the "Tercera Posición" (Third Position) was believed to have contributed to the disruption of traditional Argentine values, social hierarchies, and modes of collective and individual behavior. The technical justification for the exclusion of these social groups (as the social bases of Peronism) was that the national economy needed to be stabilized, the state

required rationalization, and a perceived subversive threat needed to be effectively countered. Since this view held that the demagogic policies of the Peronist regime of 1946-1955 started the cycle of national decay, and since the succeeding non-Peronist civilian regimes were considered to have been either too weak or vacillatory to accomplish the necessary requirements for national stabilization, it would take a firm hand to deal with these pathologies. Be it in the form of labor legislation that protected the "vertical" structure of the Peronist-dominated union movement, be it in the protection of inefficient domestic industries and state enterprises in which the working and lower classes were concentrated, or be it the social welfare and related services that had been used by Perón to cement working class and lower middle class support, all state-sponsored activities that contributed to the survival of the Peronist movement needed to be severely curtailed, when not eliminated. With regard to the last of the areas mentioned above, those state services that could not be transferred to private hands would per force disappear. In this regard, these regimes represented extensions--indeed, incremental deepening--of the "Revolución Libertadora" that had ousted Juan Perón in 1955. The difference between them lies in that the "Revolución Libertadora" was by design a temporary, caretaker regime whose mission was to "cleanse" the Argentine political system of the residual Peronist vestiges before returning power to civilian elected authorities. With the failure of that initial project, the succeeding attempts at military rule were more extensive, especially in terms of the social objectives underlying economic policy, the long-term commitment to rule (each lasted seven years in power), and in the systematic way in which the military came to influence the policy-making process. The three military regimes can thus be arranged on a continuum of institutionalization ranging from the caretaker role

of the "Revolución Libertadora" to the ruler roles of the "Revolución Argentina" and the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional." (O'Donnell, 1978; 1982; Wynia, 1978, 1986). In fact, as we shall see below, incremental militarization went in hand with increased institutionalization, and was particularly evident in the composition of the state apparatus under the last two regimes. It is for this reason that we shall concentrate our attention on the latter, leaving aside for the moment the effect on public policy brought about by the installation of the caretaker "Revolución Libertadora." As we shall see, there exist some parallels in the policy approaches of this regime and the regime installed in 1976.

These regimes also represent a continuum of exclusion. The "Revolución Libertadora" was most interested in re-drafting the Peronist constitution of 1949 and preventing the leaders of the ousted Peronist regime from returning to power. The "Revolución Argentina" attempted to remove and replace the institutional vehicles that had allowed the Peronist movement to survive repeated purges, electoral exclusion, coercive intimidation, and internal factionalism, to say nothing of the long-term exile of its namesake (Ranis, 1966). Finally, the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" represented a comprehensive attempt to use state terror, economic reforms, and social policy to disrupt the collective identities of the social groups that were the mainstay of the Peronist movement, thereby producing conditions of individual regression and isolation that made the subordinate fractions of Argentine society more easily subject to market forces in general, and to the dictates of a restorative variant of "liberal" economic doctrine in particular (which attempted to reimpose the primacy of the agro-export and transnational sectors over the domestic industrial classes). Known erroneously as "market fascism," this project represented the maximum (and darkest) expression of the zero-sum economic and political competition--the

"impossible game" described by O'Donnell (1973)--that characterized Argentina during the postwar era (Buchanan, 1985a; 1987a). As we explain below, the scope of this last regime's transformation goals was particularly reflected in the distribution of resources to areas of the state that were directly connected with the excluded social groups. In each case, the "depth" of exclusion of opposition groups paralleled increases in the level of militarization in those areas of the state apparatus.

That all three projects ultimately failed attests to the enduring strength of Peronism as a political force, and to the resiliency of civil society when confronted by the politics of exclusion. What this common failure did not prevent, though, was the shifts in public policy that went in hand with the transfer of government authority by coup d'état and the subsequent militarization of the state apparatus. In all cases, shifts in policy were accompanied by shifts in budgetary allocations in certain functional areas of state activity after the military's entrance in power.

In postwar Argentina, each instance of military rule has signified one stroke in the cyclic pattern of "pendular" shifts in political alliances that characterized this period (O'Donnell, 1976; also see Merks, 1969). Translated by victorious political alliances into public policy (including the "coup coalitions" mentioned by O'Donnell that constituted the initial nucleus of authority in the military regimes), the ebb and flow of these shifts had the effect of promoting a tidal process of organizational development within the Argentine state apparatus, something that was manifest in a seemingly endless series of bureaucratic reorganizations, reversals, readjustments, and partial reinstatements, in budgetary shifts at the macro-and microeconomic levels, and in

personnel recruitment and turnover patterns (Buchanan, 1985a; also see Most, 1980).

Within the state, these pendular shifts were concretely evident in the bifrontal and segmental character of state corporatist modes of interest group administration under the military-bureaucratic regimes (Oszlak and O'Donnell, 1976; O'Donnell, 1977). Inclusionary instruments comprised of state-provided inducements for cooperation were utilized to facilitate the access of allied social groups to decision-making positions (as a form of quasi-societal corporatism), while exclusionary instruments that emphasized state-imposed constraints were used to prevent subordinate group interference with the formulation and implementation of public policy (Collier and Collier, 1979; O'Donnell, 1978; O'Donnell, 1979; Oszlak, 1980; also see Stepan, 1985). Thus the "Revolución Argentina" opened the doors of the economic management branch to the industrial bourgeoisie (both national and transnational) while the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" did the same for the agro-export and transnational financial elites. Both regimes systematically closed all avenues of institutional access previously afforded the lower middle and working classes (Rouquié, 1982; Waldmann and Garzón Valdez, 1983; Buchanan, 1985a; 1987a). Hence, while the economic development strategies of the allied social groups can be hypothesized as having a positive effect on the aggregate amount of public resources directed towards the economic management branch in both cases, the exclusion of opposition groups should be similarly reflected in a negative distribution of public resources to those areas of state activity most directly connected with them, i.e. public goods, especially social services such as health, housing, social security, welfare, and education, and in state agencies responsible for interest group articulation (such as national labor administration).

With regard to the relative degrees of militarization, the three postwar military regimes represent sequential attempts at deepening the military's control over the state apparatus. The "Revolución Libertadora," as a caretaker regime, limited militarization to the apex of the state (in this case the executive branch), and a few selected agencies where the Peronist presence was deemed to be particularly heavy (such as the Labor Ministry). The "Revolución Argentina" further militarized the apex of the state in the form of the junta of commanders-in-chief, and designated high-ranking military officers as cabinet members in defense-related portfolios, as provincial governors, and in selected other upper-echelon positions such as ambassadors, executive branch advisors, and the like. The remainder of the state apparatus, however, continued in the hands of civilians, although this control was divided between representatives of allied groups in high-echelon positions and career public servants in all other posts (as was the case with both labor and health administration). Ultimate oversight authority was vested in the military leadership of the executive branch (Grondona, 1967; Niosi, 1974; O'Donnell, 1982). In the case of the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional," the extent of militarization of the upper and middle echelons of the state apparatus was unprecedented in that it was virtually complete. "With the exceptions of the Ministry of Economy (entirely controlled by civilians) and the Ministry of Education (in which the military shared management positions with like-minded civilians), every major branch of the state was staffed through the department level with military personnel...Rank had its privileges: flag officers (generals and admirals) were awarded cabinet and subcabinet positions (ministers, secretaries, and undersecretaries), while upper-rank field grade officers (colonels, commodores, majors, captains) were assigned positions down to the level of directors of departments" (Buchan-

an, 1987a, p. 352; also see Oszlak, 1980, and Rouquié, 1982b). The perceived need for extensive militarization of the state apparatus was due to the fact that, like the "Revolución Libertadora" (and unlike the "Revolución Argentina," which ousted a non-Peronist regime), the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" removed a Peronist regime from power. Given the failures of the previous authoritarian projects, and the levels of corruption, political strife, and social anomaly extant under the government of Isabel Perón, the need to remove Peronist influences from Argentine institutional and social life (both public and private) required an unprecedented degree of military control over both the state and society.

The extent of this "deepening" of military control was also evident in other ways. Control over lead agencies, as well as all provincial governorships and many ambassadorships and other high ranking posts, was divided among the three branches of the armed forces. The army assumed control over the internal control agencies (including the ministries of Interior and Labor), the navy assumed control of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Social Welfare, and the Air Force supervised the Ministry of Transportation. It is significant to note that while the army, as the largest service, had a "natural" responsibility for managing the internal control agencies (especially given the levels of social strife and political terrorism of the time), the navy was given control of the social welfare branch, which included the secretaries of Housing, Public Health, and Social Security. As the most consistently anti-Peronist of the armed forces (Potash, 1980; Rouquié, 1982a; Imaz, 1964), this gave the navy the opportunity to restructure those state agencies that had been given the most emphasis by the preceeding Peronist regime. Together, this division of functional responsibilities, coupled with the particulars of the regime's socio-economic project

and the depth to which direct military control extended in the state apparatus, represented a considerable deepening of militarization with respect to previous Argentine exercises in non-competitive rule (Buchanan, 1985a, 1987a).

Like the "Revolución Libertadora" and the "Revolución Argentina," the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" disbanded the legislature and placed the judiciary under de facto military supervision. In all three cases an Army officer was appointed president, since he was the representative of the largest service. In the latter two cases, the powers of the executive branch were expanded along with the creation of the junta of commanders-in-chief and during the last military regime, the presidential term was fixed at a non-renewable five years in an attempt to institutionalize succession. However, unlike its predecessors, the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" seriously limited civilian participation in the decision-making processes, confining them to the economic management and education/ideological branches. Though not inconsequential by any means (since the economic branch made all economic policy decisions, including those affecting the field of labor relations, and controlled all non-military public enterprises, the Central Bank, and the secretariats of Agriculture, Commerce, Finance, and Industry, while control of the educational system allowed them to purge curricula of "subversive" influences), such limitations on civilian control of the state had a strong effect on the process of policy-formation, since military criteria strongly influenced the full range of policy concerns.

Under both the "Revolución Argentina" and the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional," civilian presence in the state apparatus (including non-military branches) was inversely proportional to military representation. This had an interesting effect on the levels of autonomy achieved by different branches of

the state. In the economic management branch where the civilian presence was uniformly heavy (albeit selective in terms of social backgrounds), the levels of autonomy were quite low, since it was in this branch where the civilian allies of the military hierarchy were concentrated, and where their sectoral economic objectives were transformed (as a form of theoretical cement that justified the imposition of authoritarian controls on society) into national economic policy. In those branches charged with enforcing the exclusion of opposition groups (such as the ministries of Social Welfare, Interior, and Labor), the degree of autonomy with respect to those groups was quite high. This was all the more evident under the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional," where all of the branches responsible for implementing and enforcing exclusionary policies were placed under military control. Thus, the bifrontal and segmental character of state corporatism under these regimes had the effect of promoting a similar bifrontal and segmental pattern of state autonomy, high where exclusionary responsibilities were paramount, low where inclusionary instruments were dominant. Under the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" this tendency reached its highest expression: state autonomy was high where the civilian presence was least, low where it was greatest (Buchanan, 1987b; Stepan, 1985). We can therefore hypothesize that the degree of "permeability" of the military-bureaucratic state by sectoral interests is inversely proportional to its degree of militarization.

What this implies is that, because of its higher level of militarization and autonomy vis à vis civil society, the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" had a greater degree of discretion when it came to the budgetary process than did the "Revolución Argentina." Contrary to the latter, which had to contend with civilian factions both within and without the state when it came to

allocating resources to different areas of state activity, the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" could allocate resources as it preferred, secure in the knowledge that the militarized state apparatus would prevent serious opposition from arising against their budgetary decisions. Hence, the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" can be considered to be an example of military-bureaucratic authoritarianism where military priorities in virtually all policy areas (save the economic management branch) were paramount, since the degree of military control of the state apparatus ensured that policy decisions were insulated from, and did not have to compete with, the demands of civilian sectors both inside and outside the state. In effect, it was the objective conditions surrounding their assumption of power, coupled with the lessons learned from the experience of their military predecessors, plus the complementary nature of the social and political objectives of the civilian economic team, that prompted the uniformed architects of the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" to extend military control over the state apparatus in order to better enforce the terms of their joint project of societal reorganization. We can therefore surmise that social and economic objectives unhindered by sectoral interference or other forms of concession or compromise with civil society are what determined the level of budgetary allocations in core policy areas under this regime. As such, the "Proceso" represents one of the "purer" forms of militarism recently witnessed in the region, comparable in this respect with the Pinochet regime in Chile or the Velasco regime in Peru (despite the more personalistic character of the former and the ideological differences of the latter). It was only after the convergence of a worsening economic crisis and a crisis of presidential succession in 1981 (the "Achilles Heel" of BA regimes mentioned by O'Donnell) that the regime's ability to disguise its internal

tensions and insulate itself from the pressures emanating from civil society began to visibly wane. At that point the regime attempted to stage a diversion in order to deflect public attention from its internal problems while at the same time re-establishing its authority over an increasingly restless population. The results of the Malvinas/Falklands adventure--a classic recipe for authoritarian collapse in the form of involvement in a foreign war resulting in military defeat--are now well known. (Altamirano, 1982; Mackin, 1983; Picón-Berlin, 1985).

The point is that for the first five years of its rule, the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" exhibited a level of militarization, segmental state autonomy, and a general insulation from civil society that was unparalleled in Argentine history, including that seen under the "Revolución Argentina". All of these traits had a profound effect on the character and content of public policy; it is our task to determine if this was reflected in macro- and micro-economic indicators as well.

Although it would be worth delving at further length into the differences between the "Revolución Argentina" and the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional," this is not the place for such an undertaking. Moreover, since our focus is on the two institutionalized military-bureaucratic regimes, we do not analyze the 1962-1963 military-backed caretaker government headed by José María Guido, nor do we differentiate between the civilian (elected) regimes. We consequently avoid discussion of the obvious contrasts between the minority Unión Cívica Radical government of Arturo Illia (1963-1966) and the populist Peronist government (1973-1976) beyond generally evaluating the impact each had on public policy and budgetary allocations in core functional areas. Although inferences can be drawn from the data we present, at the aggregate level the dividing line

with emphasis on the latter. Exploration of the differences between the civilian regimes shall have to wait. Until such a time, the reader is advised to consult the extensive literature on the subject (e.g. Cavarozzi, 1983; Historia Política Argentina, 1985; Wynia, 1978; 1986). For the moment consider that the two military-bureaucratic regimes examined here promoted different degrees of militarization in the state apparatus, and hence should evidence significant differences at the level of public policy. It is to the empirical analysis of this hypothesis that we now turn.

III. Budgetary Allocations.

Our economic analysis covers two overlapping categories of budgetary data. The first is aggregate macroeconomic data on central administrative expenditures for social and military functions from 1961 to 1982, classified by civilian or military regime type. The longer time frame allows for better consideration of trends begun before the UCR regime was installed in 1963, which in turn permits a better evaluation of the subsequent budgetary impact of the military-bureaucratic regimes. Non-defense related expenditures are sub-divided into economic development, social service, and general administration categories. The second type of budgetary data consists of a linear or longitudinal time series micro-economic survey of central administrative expenditures on national health and labor administration for the period 1963-1982, coupled with observations about the general organizational features displayed by these areas under the military regimes in question. Besides adding further historical and contextual depth, this will allow us to directly compare macro- and micro-economic indicators over time and across regime types in selected core areas of state activity (and in the case of the military regimes, between them), then relate our findings to the

the case of the military regimes, between them), then relate our findings to the relative degree of militarization under the last two military-bureaucratic regimes. The combination of perspectives is designed to provide the type of analytic overlap that has often been missing in the empirical literature.

Our reason for choosing these particular core areas of state activity for microeconomic scrutiny stems from the fact that public health is a universally recognized public good, while labor administration represents the institutional nexus in which working class demands and interests are mediated by the state. One is concerned with administering the interests of a fundamental producer group, while the other is concerned with providing a basic necessity for human capital enhancement. More importantly, although labor administration is more obviously political in character, health administration also reflects the ongoing status of political conflict under different regimes. Hence, if the theoretical literature is correct, both areas should evidence tangible differences between civilian and military regimes. This is especially so in the cases studied here, since organized labor eventually (although not initially, since different labor factions favored both corps) represented the largest source of opposition to both of the military regimes once they were installed, and public health was considered by both to be one of those areas of state activity that had been a source of waste and inefficiency under civilian governments. If theory holds true, budgetary shifts (downward) in both areas should be evident under the military-bureaucratic regimes, and should be most pronounced under the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional."

We should add two notes of caution, however. The infamous unreliability of government-provided economic data is especially true for these military regimes, and should be viewed as a "best face" effort on their part, particularly with

regard to the macroeconomic data. The microeconomic survey is designed to uncover some of the realities that underlie the macroeconomic "best face." Secondly, here we focus on budgetary allocations as policy outputs, as opposed to systemic performance (policy outcomes). The lag time between policy output and outcome makes assessment of systemic effects extremely difficult, yet does not disguise the regime's intent at the moment of output. For the moment we shall defer consideration of systemic performance. Even so, recent research suggests that the policies of the heavily militarized "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" did have a significant negative impact on Argentine society (O'Donnell, 1983; Buchanan, 1987a), and that this negative authoritarian legacy persists to this day (and is in fact a major source of the democratic regime's current difficulties) (Oszlak, 1984; Crítica y Utopía, 1983).

A. Macroeconomic Results.²

Macroeconomic analysis of the share of central government allocations for the period 1961-1982 was performed by regressing each of the eight dummy variables individually on the share of the main budgetary classifications. These included: point begin; defense; general administration; domestic security; total social services, including education, health, social security-welfare, other social expenditures, and housing; and economic development. To determine the impact on military expenditures of changes in regime type, a series of dummy variables were created. There is sufficient reason to believe that regime type does not have the same meaning over time (O'Donnell, 1978), i.e. the first and second military regimes in fact have few similarities with regard to economic policy, with the same holding true for the civilian regimes. The analysis is then repeated for the 1963-1982 time frame. At least eight

different representations of the 1963-1982 regime types make sense (Table 1; all tables are located in Appendix A), with :

1. DUMPB representing the standard civilian/military dichotomy;
2. DUMP depicting structural shifts upwards over time between the 1960's regimes to the Peronists and finally the second military regime. If DUMP is statistically significant, the country would have experienced two sharp breaks upward in the amount of funds allocated to military expenditures during the 1963-1983 period;
3. DUMPA similar to DUMP with three upward structural shifts produced with regime change, i.e. increased militarization with regime change;
4. DUMPC assuming military regimes in Argentina to allocate significantly more resources to defense than their civilian counterparts, with the Peronists more inclined to increase defense expenditures than the UCR regime;
5. DUMPD similar to DUMPC but with the UCR regime more prone to step up military spending than the Peronists;
6. DUMPE assuming the Peronists least likely to give priority to defense, followed by the UCR regime, then the first military regime, with the second military regime most heavily increasing military spending;
7. DUMPF assuming no real change in military allocation priorities in the 1960's, a sharp decline under the Peronist regime, and a major shift upwards under the second military regime. This interpretation is most often implicitly assumed in the theoretical literature;
8. DUMPG assuming again that the Peronists are least likely to undertake military spending, followed by the UCR regime. It is used to test whether the first military regime was more inclined to allocate funds to defense purposes than the second military regime.

The results (Table 2) for the 1963-1982 period indicate that:

1. The shift from civilian to military regimes tends to increase the share of the budget allocated to defense, with the second military regime marginally inclined to be more prone to raise defense expenditures (the statistically significant DUMPE, but lower value than DUMPD, which assumes the first and second military regimes to be equally inclined to increase the share of the budget allocated to defense over that of their civilian predecessors);

2. There has been a secular shift downwards over time in the share of the budget allocated to general administration (the high statistical significance of DUMPA);

3. Domestic security allocations appear to be insensitive to regime change (the insignificance of the t value for each political shift variable);

4. The share of allocations going to total social services are reduced on the assumption of power by the military regimes (the consistently significant and negative t value for the dummy shift variables), with the second military regime more inclined to reduce social expenditures than the first (the relatively high t value for DUMPE and DUMPF). This directly confirms the "deepening" hypothesis;

5. The budgetary share allocated to education is particularly and negatively affected by the assumption of power by the military (consistently significant and negative t value for the dummy political shift variable); education allocations were especially vulnerable during the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" (the high significance of DUMPF);

6. The share of the budget allocated to health does not appear to be significantly affected by regime type;

7. The share of the budget allocated to social security and welfare seems to increase secularly over time and is not related to civilian-military regime types (the statistical significance of DUMPA and insignificance of the other dummy shift variables);

8. The share of the budget allocated to other social expenditures is reduced by both military regimes, with the second military regime's reductions being greater (the statistical significance of DUMPF);

9. The share of the budget allocated to housing is also reduced by the military regimes, with the second military regime having the larger (negative) impact (the higher significance of DUMPE and DUMPF expanded with DUMPD). This supports findings reported elsewhere (e.g. Yugnovsky, 1985);

10. Economic development allocations have decreased secularly as a share of the budget (the high negative t values for DUMP and DUMPA). There is some evidence that the military regimes have been inclined to increase allocations to this area over those likely to have been made by the civilian regimes (the positive and significant t values for DUMPD, DUMPE, DUMPF, and DUMPG).

Analysis of the impact of military and civilian regimes on the share of major budgetary allocations indicates that the thesis that military regimes appear inclined to increase defense expenditures and economic development allocations at the expense of social expenditures holds quite consistently for modern Argentina. Less uniformly but still significantly, the results also confirm the "deepening" hypothesis advanced here. As with the analysis of regime type and the level and share of military expenditure, a comparison of the 1961-1975 and 1966-1982 sub-periods provides additional insights into the shift in national priorities that followed the change from civilian to military regimes in Argentina.

A comparison of the results by budgetary category for the extended time frame (Tables 3-4)³ indicate that:

1. In both sub-periods, there was a general shift towards the share of central government budgets allocated to defense when regimes changed from civilian to military. For the 1961-1975 period, the greatest shift occurred (downward) when the Peronists assumed power (DUMPF), with no distinction made between the UCR regime and the "Revolución Argentina." The results for the second (1966-1982) time period largely confirm those obtained for the 1961-1982 period as a whole (Table 4). The share of funds allocated to defense increase with the ascent of the military regimes. However, there appears to be little difference between the two regimes in their inclination to increase the share of the defense budget (statistical significance of DUMPC, DUMPB, DUMPD greater than DUMPE, DUMPF, or DUMPG). Increased use of repression as an instrument of policy by the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional," it seems, did not require increases in budgetary outlays to defense, just a more directed use of available resources (as we shall see in our microeconomic analysis of labor administration).

2. When looking at the 1966-1982 period, the share of the budget allocated to public administration generally follows the secular decline observed for the period as a whole (with DUMP and DUMPA highly significant). The second military regime also seems more inclined to reduce this expenditure than the first military regime, and certainly more inclined to do so than the Peronists (statistical significance of DUMPF). The 1961-1975 period, however, showed no real shift in the share of allocations to general administration after a change of regime.

3. Again, as with the period as a whole, the share of the budgetary resources allocated to domestic security was not affected by regime change in

either sub-period, paralleling the findings with regards to defense expenditures.

4. The share of the budget allocated to total social services was reduced by the military regimes in the second period, with the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" evidencing a greater shift in resources away from this category. The only statistically significant dummy variable for the first time period was DUMPF, where the first civilian regime and the first military regime are treated as equal.

5. The general pattern for total social services is confused for education, with the second time period showing a consistently strong inclination by the second military regime to reduce allocations to this area. In the first time period, non-statistically significant shifts in funds allocated to education occurred after the regime changes. The importance of this stems from the fact that the education branch was staffed by civilians under both military regimes. This contradictory evidence of the relationship between relative militarization and policy output is mitigated somewhat by the presence of military personnel in the Education Ministry (recall that they shared upper-echelon positions with like-minded civilians) during the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional," which had the most marked drop in expenditures in this area (which more than likely stemmed from the regime's attempts to purge the educational system of purported subversive influences).

6. The first time period depicts a marked shift downwards in health expenditures when the Peronists assumed office, but little change between the UCR regime and the "Revolución Argentina." The 1966-1982 time period simply depicts the secular reduction in funds allocated to health with no real distinc-

tion between civilian and military regimes. As we shall see, this is contradicted by the microeconomic analysis.

7. As for the period as a whole, neither sub-period experienced any pattern of change in social security and welfare allocations that can be correlated with regime changes.

8. Other social expenditures went up sharply with the Peronists in the first time period, with little distinction, however, found between the first civilian and first military regimes. There was a slight inclination in the second time period for the second military regime to cut budget allocations to this category.

9. Housing was severely cut by the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" (DUMPE, Table 4; also see Yugnovsky, 1985), while the Peronists increased housing expenditures sharply. No such distinction was found between the UCR regime and the "Revolución Argentina" (a slight difference is present as indicated by DUMPD, DUMPE, and DUMPG in Table 3).

10. With regard to economic development, the second time period indicates that the second military regime was more willing to allocate funds for this activity than the first military regime, and very much more so than the Peronists (DUMPF in Table 3). There was, however, a fairly strong downward trend (DUMP) during this time period. The first sub-period again saw little distinction between the civilian and military regimes, with the Peronists very inclined to use funds for purposes other than economic development.

The major results from the analysis of the sub-periods are:

1. In general, military regimes are much more inclined to shift resources to defense than are their civilian counterparts, with little distinction between

the first and second military regimes. The Peronists were less inclined to spend on defense than the UCR regime.

2. Military regimes in modern Argentina are, in general, more likely to reduce social expenditures than are their civilian counterparts, although the major cuts appear to be selective, focusing on education and housing rather than on health or social security and welfare. Such reductions appear less selective and more significant under the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional."

3. Military regimes have an inclination to increase economic development expenditures over that allocated by civilian regimes, attesting to the non-competitive and insulated mature economic policy making under them.

4. For a number of budgetary areas--total social services, health, other social expenditures, housing and economic development--there was little change in allocations between the UCR regime and the "Revolución Argentina."

5. The first military regime appears to be less inclined to reduce social expenditures (presumably in order to shift them to defense) than the second military regime, and there is little distinction in this area between the UCR regime and the "Revolución Argentina."

6. Overall, the hypothesized shifts are logically confirmed even though the civilian-military dichotomy generally has a stronger correlation than the "deepening" variables. But then, it seems intuitively obvious that policy differences between civilian and military regimes be greater than those between similarly-oriented military regimes. The point is that policy differences expressed in macroeconomic indicators between civilian and military regimes are greater the deeper the level of militarization of the state apparatus.

B. Microeconomic Results: Expenditures for National Health and Labor Administration.⁴

1. Labor Administration.

a. The "Revolución Argentina," 1966-1973.

Under the "Revolución Argentina," the Labor Secretariat (which was demoted from its cabinet-level status and incorporated as a sub-cabinet agency in the Ministry of Social Welfare, in a tangible manifestation of the military regime's basic perspective on labor relations) was classified as part of general administration in 1966 and 1967, a carry-over from the previous regime. Under the preceeding civilian regime, national labor administration averaged 0.25 percent of the central administrative budget, and ranked fifth out of eight ministries in total allocations (Buchanan, 1985a, p.245). In 1968 the Labor Secretariat was re-classified as part of the economic development branch, where it remained until after the second Peronist regime was installed in 1973. As part of the economic development branch, national labor administration never received more than 0.5 percent of the total allocated to that area (which included all agencies controlled by the Ministry of Economy, plus several semi-autonomous agencies and state enterprises). Since this sector was only the third largest employer of central administrative personnel, and since personnel outlays consumed the largest part of the central administrative budget (Presupuesto General de la Nación, 1966; Folleto de Divulgación, 1971), it seems clear that national labor administration was financially and politically a low priority for the "Revolución Argentina." In fact, of the Secretariats under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy after 1968, the Labor Secretariat and its dependencies consistently ranked fifth or sixth of seven such agencies in allocations

received. As a percentage of the central administrative budget, this diminished priority was even more evident,

with the Labor Secretariat's share falling from 0.22 percent in 1966 to just 0.01 in 1970 (Buchanan, 1985a; p.249; Buchanan, 1985b).

As for the distribution of funds within the Labor Secretariat, the growing importance given to administrative, inspection, and research-related functions was paralleled by reductions in agencies charged with labor oversight responsibilities. This organizational emphasis on the internal as opposed to external responsibilities accentuated a trend also begun by the preceeding civilian regimes. By 1970, the two agencies that provided the main points of contact with organized labor--the National Directorate of Professional Relations and the National Directorate of Labor Relations--together received less than either the National Directorate of Human Resources (which had research and statistic-gathering responsibilities) or the Secretary's office (which was mainly concerned with internal administrative responsibilities, since labor policy was formulated in the civilian elite-controlled Ministry of Economics). Their individual budgets exceeded only that of the National Directorate of Legal Affairs, an agency with less than half as many employees and considerably fewer obligations.

The continued downgrading of welfare responsibilities provided by national labor administration is amply evident in the Labor Secretariat budgets for the period. In 1966 and 1967 welfare agencies received 0.23 of the Labor Secretariat's budget. As of 1968 they were no longer included as a category within the Secretariat, having been transferred to the Social Welfare Ministry (Presupuesto General de la Nación, for the years cited). All of this indicates that on a financial as well as organizational level, the "Revolución Argentina" was

accelerating the process of downgrading and altering the basic orientation of national labor administration.

Not content with previous attempts to impose tighter accounting procedures over allocations to labor administration, the "Revolución Argentina" imposed a series of more rigorous accounting standards. Non-personnel outlays were explicitly documented in the secretariat's budget, and generally covered capital investments in infrastructural necessities such as equipment and office supplies, as well as other items like accident indemnities, etc. As of 1969, directorates, as lead agencies in their respective functional areas, became responsible for administering their own non-personnel allocations, reversing the policy of administering these outlays through one general fund established by the Frondizi limited democratic administration in 1959. This rearrangement supports the view that a decentralizing trend was at work within the Labor Secretariat at the time. Given this, it is not surprising that non-personnel outlays within the Labor Secretariat were highest in those agencies that had substantial material requirements for performance of their respective tasks, particularly those with administration and inspection responsibilities.

The overall financial picture of national labor administration under the "Revolución Argentina" complements its organizational demotion. On a general level, it received very low priority within the regime's economic program, where it was placed after being stripped of its welfare responsibilities (under the UCR regime it had operated as the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). Within the Labor Secretariat, the decentralizing and compartmentalizing trend was paralleled by decreased budgetary outlays for the agencies involved (in marked contrast to the budgetary increases awarded the economic policy branch in general), with financial emphasis placed on more "neutral" internal functions

such as administration, inspection, and research, while outlays to more "political" external agencies such as those responsible for labor relations and professional associations were reduced considerably. Salary and other personnel-related outlays occupied most of the budget for all agencies, and the ratio of personnel to non-personnel expenses remained constant for the entire period.

After the first president of the "Revolución Argentina," General Juan Carlos Onganía, was removed in 1970, the regime embarked on a gradual liberalization leading to its voluntary withdrawal from power and Peronist electoral victory in 1973. The only significant shift in budgetary allocations to national labor administration followed its re-elevation to cabinet status in 1971. External, labor-related tasks such as union registration, mediation, and arbitration came to occupy an increased share of labor administration's attention as the date established for the devolution of power drew closer, and consequently began to receive a larger portion of the outlays (especially personnel-related outlays) awarded to labor administration. Even so, this re-orientation was not reflected at the level of overall expenditures, where labor administration continued to receive an average of 0.5 percent of the funds designated for the economic development branch, and just 0.17 percent of the central administrative budget. In fact, with its initial demotion and stripping of welfare responsibilities, the outlays to national labor administration under the "Revolución Argentina" were the lowest of the postwar period (Buchanan, 1985a, pp.247-256; Buchanan, 1985b; also see Chart 1 in Appendix B). In terms of our concerns, it should be noted that here labor administration was managed by civilians, specifically career civil servants who implemented policy directives that were passed down by the civilian regime elites who controlled the Ministry of Economy. In a sense, the accentuation of internal organizational

trends started by the preceeding civilian regime was designed to ease the process of implementing the regime's exclusionary labor policies. (Buchanan, 1985b).

b. The "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional," 1976-1983.

In many respects, the military-bureaucratic regime installed on March 24, 1976 opted to continue the tidal pattern of organizational change within the state apparatus by repeating the approach of the "Revolución Libertadora" towards national labor administration. Besides the obvious fact that they both deposed Peronist regimes, both of these military regimes had similar "external" perspectives on the labor "problem." As in the case of the "Revolución Argentina," both regimes outlawed and banned the political and economic activities of virtually all labor organizations, confiscated union funds and property, altered the law of professional associations in order to break the "vertical" structure of the Peronist-dominated union movement, prohibited the right to strike, and systematically used military interventors and coercion to surpress overt dissent within the labor movement. In this respect they increased the salience of these exclusionary measures when compared with the "Revolución Argentina," to say nothing of the civilian regimes. This was also the case with respect to budgetary allocations. As with the "Revolución Libertadora," the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" did not alter the classification of national labor administration within the central administrative budget, leaving it in the social welfare category where it had been placed by the preceeding Peronist regime. However, unlike the rest of the social welfare branch, which was under the jurisdiction of the Navy-controlled Ministry of Social Welfare, labor administration retained organizational autonomy in the form of the army-con-

trolled Ministry of Labor. The more overt control role required Army occupation of organized labor's institutional referent, and gave it a special place within the "social welfare" allocation category (see Buchanan, 1985a). Since the division of labor established at the onset of the "Proceso" allowed the civilian-led Ministry of Economy to formulate the budget for all non-defense agencies within reductionist parameters anyway (the military having been awarded expanded budgetary prerogatives in all defense-related agencies), there were less inter-military conflicts over the allocation of outlays to the social welfare budgetary category, despite the overlap of Army and Navy "jurisdictional" responsibilities.

Like the "Revolución Libertadora", the "Proceso" did substantially reduce the overall amount of allocations to the welfare sector in general, including national labor administration. In 1976 the Labor Ministry and its affiliated agencies received 0.17 percent of the central administrative budget (similar to the percentage seen under the "Revolución Argentina" but down from an average of 0.45 percent under the Peronist regime), rising to 0.30 by 1980 before falling to 0.2 percent in 1982 (Presupuesto General de la Nación, for the years cited; also see Chart 1 in Appendix B). As was the case with the "Revolución Libertadora," this was essentially half of the amount delegated to national labor administration under the preceeding Peronist regime (Buchanan, 1985a).

Within the Labor Ministry, the distribution of allocations remained much the same as before, although at the generally lower levels prompted by the general reduction in funds to labor administration as a whole. Many functions, especially those of regional labor delegations, were removed from the budget and turned over to provincial authorities, much as had been the case under the "Revolución Libertadora." Outlays to labor-related agencies continued to absorb

most of the budget allocated to centralized agencies, since it was here where the military presence was felt greatest, and where the regime's constraints on union activities were enforced with funds channeled to union interventors. In fact, the small but steady rise of the budget allocated to national labor administration during this period may be attributed to its heavy level of militarization (as a leading control agency) and a re-emphasis on the coercive features of the regime's exclusionary labor policies. Thus, within the generally lower budgetary parameters established for the social welfare branch, labor administration could enjoy a small upward trend in allocations due to the reinforced use of its coercive obligations.

Returning to a trend that had been reversed by the Peronist regime, accounting procedures for non-personnel outlays were ostensibly tightened, which reduced the amount of these outlays within the Ministry of Labor budget. Unlike other agencies in the social welfare budgetary category, labor administration did not have formal benefit distribution responsibilities, other than the "expertise" of its employees in the field of labor relations. However, under the war-like perspective of the "Proceso," organized labor was viewed as a major enemy rather than a client, and expertise was replaced by institutionally enforced exclusion. Even so, the whole-scale intervention of unions allowed the army to gain control over union treasuries, property, and other assets (especially the "Obras Sociales" union health and welfare services). The highly discretionary use of these assets allowed the army to reduce non-personnel outlays without losing any of the material benefits they otherwise would have forsaken. In fact, the indulgence of creature comforts was increased exponentially along with union intervention, since what had once been a bastion of Peronist corruption became the province of army officers (and infantry officers

in particular) (Buchanan, 1985a). Personnel costs therefore continued to occupy the majority of official outlays throughout national labor administration. Along with a change in "expertise," the purge of Peronist personnel and their replacement by military officers helped increase personnel outlays to labor administration, since civil service scales were replaced by military pay scales. This magnified the effects of the slight increase in funds allotted to labor administration throughout the period, since there was an overall reduction of personnel employed in this area relative to the previous regime (Buchanan, 1985a). The point is that, while labor administration did not suffer the hypothesized budgetary reductions as a consequence of the "deepening" of military control over it, the distribution and use of funds, to say nothing of the character of activities supported by these funds, changed drastically. Intensified labor repression and military corruption here combined to belie our "deepening" thesis, since labor administration offered an institutional vehicle that allowed for the simultaneous satisfaction of the individual (material) and corporate (political) goals of the military officers that staffed it.

Overall, the financial picture within national labor administration under the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" more closely resembles that of the provisional military regime of 1955-1958 rather than the regime that ruled from 1966 to 1973. This is not surprising given that national labor administration was heavily militarized under both the "Revolución Libertadora" and the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional," while it was not under the "Revolución Argentina." In the case of the "Revolución Libertadora" it was one of the few core areas of state activity so militarized (since it had become an institutional bastion of the first Peronist regime and needed to be thoroughly "cleansed"). In the case of the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" it was simply one manifestation of

the larger militarization of the entire state apparatus that was part of a systematic project of societal transformation. It seems clear that its highly sensitive position as the primary institutional link with organized labor made it appear especially appropriate for militarization in each case, given the economic, political, and social objectives of both regimes, and the level of crisis that preceeded their advent to power.

One important fact that emerges from this examination is the inadequacy of macroanalytic approaches when evaluating regime approaches towards this type of core state activity. This is because labor administration is consistently hidden in the "general administration" or "social services-other" budgetary categories (areas in which very little and statistically insignificant changes were observed for all regimes), and receives a very small percentage of the allocations to either category in all cases. Hence, the elimination of labor-related welfare services from labor administration in 1968 and the coercive re-emphasis of its regulatory powers (especially the powers of direct intervention in unions) in 1976, to say nothing of the elimination of many neutral internal administrative tasks, the substitution of military/or civilial pay scales, and the discretionary use of confiscated union assets to bolster official budgetary outlays under the latter military regime, cannot be adequately explained by using a macroeconomic focus. Only by coupling it with a microeconomic approach can we begin to discern the subtle budgetary changes that complement the more visible non-allocative changes that characterized each of these regime's "external" approach towards labor relations.

2. National Health Administration.

a. The "Revolución Argentina", 1966-1973.

Central administrative outlays to health administration under the "Revolución Argentina" did not vary significantly with respect to the UCR regime, averaging 2.5 percent for the first four years (during the Onganía presidency), then dropping to an average of 1.8 percent during the period 1971-1973 (Buchanan, 1985a, pp. 424-425; also see Chart 2 in Appendix B). Health administration did lose its cabinet status, as it was demoted to a Secretariat in the Ministry of Social Welfare (one of five such "superagencies" under the regime's original organizational scheme). More importantly, the vast majority of primary care centers previously operated in the provinces by national health administration were transferred to provincial authority. Thus, while central administrative expenditures were reduced only slightly, the overall level of primary care in the nation's interior dropped significantly (since the climate of fiscal constraint of the time made it impossible for the provincial governments to fully pick up the costs of the transferred centers). Personnel-related outlays continued to consume the largest share of the budget, growing from 63 to 77 percent of central administrative outlays destined for health administration during this period. Despite the transfer program, agencies with medical attention responsibilities received the largest share of these outlays, followed by those responsible for disease eradication and health education programs in the provinces. The regime's decentralizing efforts were especially felt as of 1971, and the percentage of outlays directed to health administration within the social welfare ministry declined from 52 to 33 percent by 1973. In fact, by that year outlays to decentralized and provincial agencies surpassed that of the centralized health agencies, in a dramatic reversal of the traditional distribu-

tion of the national health budget. The point is that this occurred within the lower allocation levels exhibited by health administration as a whole during the entire period in which the "Revolución Argentina" held power. By 1973 the total amount spent on public health in Argentina had dropped to less than 1 percent of the national budget (Leichter, 1979, p.78). This occurred in an area that remained under civilian control. Thus the relative levels of budgetary continuity with respect to the UCR regime can be attributed to the presence of these civilians, while the decentralizing program and its negative consequences can be viewed as the way in which military criteria for state rationalization came to influence this particular core area of state activity. More importantly, unlike labor administration, where the compartmentalizing and decentralizing trend occurred within centralized labor agencies, here the decentralizing program removed a variety of services from the purview of centralized health authorities, and placed them under the jurisdiction of provincial governments that often lacked the financial capacity to absorb the additional costs these services entailed. In both cases, the justification given for the decentralizing trend was based on technical rather than political rationales, although the political content of these moves should be obvious.

b. The "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional."

Relative to the Peronist regime of 1973-1976, allocations destined for national health administration decreased markedly during the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional," falling from 7.7 percent of the national budget in 1976 (which was formulated by the Peronist regime) to 2.0 percent in 1981. (Belmartino, Bloch, and de Quinteros, 1981; Bello, 1983; Gonzalez, 1983). As a percentage of central administrative outlays, the decrease was also dramatic,

falling from 5.4 percent in 1976 to 0.6 percent in 1981 (Presupuesto General de la Nación, for the years cited; also see Chart 2 in Appendix B). Beyond the militarization of the public health apparatus, the distribution of funds within health administration continued much as before, with emphasis accorded personnel outlays in primary care and disease control and prevention agencies. Even so, the lack of significance at the macroeconomic level is contradicted by the total distribution of funds to public health under the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional." The dramatic reductions of outlays to health-related areas not operated by centralized health administration (for example, subsidies for university hospitals, laboratories, and care facilities operated by the Ministry of Education and provincial health programs) contributed to a remarkable decline in overall levels of medical care, and contributed to the downturn in health-related statistics during this period (Belmartino, Bloch, and de Quinteros, 1981; Bello, 1983; Bermann and Escudero, 1978; Llovet, 1983; Gonzalez, 1983). The regime also eliminated the National Integrated Health System instituted by the Peronist regime, which was designed to ensure adequate medical coverage for the entire population by assigning at least 5.1 percent of the national budget to public health (Buchanan, 1985a; 1987a). In fact, the institution of that national health program also explains the apparent drop in central administrative expenditures evident at the macroeconomic level under the Peronist regime. This is because that program re-oriented the majority of funds allocated to public health through decentralized agencies (especially in the provinces), and required third party (employer and employee) contributions to the national health fund. Thus, while central administrative expenditures may well have experienced a drop in allocations (in constant terms) as the macroeconomic analysis suggests, the reality was that state expenditures on public health

actually increased markedly under the second Peronist regime. One only needs to consider the social bases and political platform of the Peronists to understand why this was so.

In any event, public health was an area of state activity where the "privatization" campaign advocated by the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" was particularly felt, as many of the eliminated health (and welfare) services were turned over to profit-oriented private concerns. As a result, the total number of beds provided by public hospitals declined by more than 25 percent during this period (Belmartino, Bloch, and de Quinteros, 1981; Bello, 1983). Here again, military control of the union-operated social health and welfare network was also evident, as many of these facilities were closed outright, thereby excluding unionists and their dependents from their traditional forms of coverage. Coupled with the "privatization" campaign, this effectively excluded a large portion of the subordinate classes from medical coverage.

Throughout this period, national health administration was entirely under the control of the Argentine navy, with some army participation evident in certain areas such as tropical disease eradication programs (especially in northern border zones). It should be recalled that the Navy controlled the Ministry of Social Welfare, under which virtually all social service agencies were grouped (including not only health administration but also the National Housing Bank, the primary public housing agency, which we have seen was an area that suffered severe reductions under the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional"). The drastic cuts in budgetary allocations in these areas can thus be seen as a direct reflection of this control, as opposed to the relative continuity displayed by health and housing administration under the "Revolución Argentina" (Yugnovsky, 1985; Buchanan, 1985a). In any case, public health policy under

the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" also differed from that of the "Revolución Libertadora," which did not militarize health administration, and which continued the technical emphasis on primary care and disease control functions that had been the mainstay of the first Peronist regime. It would seem that the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional"'s social objectives, and specifically the social objectives of the traditionally anti-Peronist Navy, are what brought about the drastic curtailment in allocations to public health. Though the negative consequences remained disguised at the macroeconomic level of aggregate central administrative expenditures (since the cuts in central administrative expenditures on health were not statistically significant), they are amply evident at the microeconomic level once decentralized administrative expenditures, and third party contributions are factored in. Hence the militarization hypothesis, rather than be contradicted or disproved by the macroeconomic data, is confirmed by a closer reading that brings the full range of the regime's intentions into broader context. Specifically, the increased "depth" of the regime's social transformation project was paralleled by the depth of militarization of national health administration, and by the extent of budgetary reductions effected by the regime in this core functional area. Suffice to say that the "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" reduced total budgetary allocations for public health to the lowest levels seen in the postwar years (Gonzalez, 1983; Buchanan, 1985a).

IV. Conclusion.

While it is true that Argentine militarism is in many respects *sui generis*, (e.g. in its adoption of a particular social project and specific relationship with different civilian sectors) it is also true that it provides a good example

of the budgetary impact of incremental militarization in the state apparatus. The same can be said for the discriminating analysis of selected core areas of state activity, which if not a comprehensive overview, allows us to examine areas of state activity that occupy the attention of virtually all regimes. Using a hybrid model that overlaps aggregate macroeconomic data with a longitudinal microeconomic survey, we have diachronically analyzed the policy impact of two military-bureaucratic regimes that promoted different levels of militarization in the same national state apparatus. From our examination we conclude that, certain variations and apparent contradictions notwithstanding, what has long been intuitively obvious is in this instance empirically correct. While the correlation is neither universal nor uniformly strong, and though certain apparent contradictions between the macro and micro budgetary levels require contextual explanation, statistical regression of macroeconomic variables nonetheless demonstrates the general budgetary shifts that follow the military's assumption of power, and that these shifts are more significant when (and where) the "depth" of military control over the state apparatus is greater. Longitudinal analysis of microeconomic variables demonstrates the specific (in this case negative) impact military regimes have on specific core areas of state activity that are directly connected with subordinate social groups, even though these policy areas differ significantly. Both political (labor administration) and non-political (health administration) branches of the state apparatus reflected significant changes in policy orientation under the military regimes that were evident in budgetary allocations to each, although in different ways. For example, some of these shifts were disguised at the macroeconomic level and appear to contradict our "deepening" hypothesis. We nevertheless conclude that recent Argentine military regimes have had a significant impact on public

policy, particularly in functional areas that directly affect excluded social groups. This impact is different from that of civilian regimes, and is most acutely felt when the state apparatus (or at least relevant branches) has been placed under direct military control. However, the apparent contradictions and variances serve to underscore the importance of combining macro and micro analyses in order to account for contextual factors, regime learning processes, and the general complexities involved in any attempt at regime type-casting. It is specific socio-economic, ideological, and political objectives that condition the organizational manifestation of individual military-bureaucratic projects, something which in turn derives from the particular circumstances leading up to and surrounding their assumption of power. This serves to underscore the importance of relative militarization as an explanatory variable for policy shifts, since in this case successive military-bureaucratic regimes with basically similar objectives learned from the failures and successes of their predecessors, and responded by sequentially coupling incremental militarization and institutionalization of their rule with more systematic approaches to public policy making. This had the effect of successively deepening the policy impact that followed the change from civilian to military regimes.

Pinochet's Chile, Velasco's Peru, and the Uruguayan military-bureaucratic regime of 1973-1985 seem obvious cases for comparison, although the verdict remains out on the question as to whether these results can be replicated cross-nationally. The basic point of this examination, however, has been to use two of the "purer" forms of militarism recently seen in Latin America in order to establish the validity of certain basic assumptions regarding the policy impact of military-bureaucratic regimes. Having moved to do so, we can now engage in the type of comparative analysis that should better explain policy differences

(or the lack thereof) based on the relative "depth" of militarization of the state apparatus exhibited by military regimes elsewhere. At a minimum, we have added another intervening variable to the debate on the policy impact of military regimes that, rather than increase confusion, is designed to simplify explanations about what remains an exceedingly complex issue.

ENDNOTES

1. The literature on civil-military relations and the impact of military regimes is too extensive to cite in its totality. By way of an overview, see Remmer (1978), Most (1980), Grindle (1987), Sloan (1986), Hughes and Mijeski (1984), Hartyln and Morely (1986), and the sources cited therein.
2. Macroeconomic results refer to budgetary analysis of the impact of regime type on central administrative expenditures only, and do not take into account the impact of other independent variables such as international market conditions, natural disasters, etc. Since our analysis concentrates on the distribution of the budgetary pie rather than on its total size, and while we recognize that contracting budgets force some hard distributional choices upon policy-makers, we believe that inclusion of such additional variables would unnecessarily complicate and dilute our findings. We obviously recognize the inherent limitations of our analysis.
3. Tables 3 and 4 contain the same dummy variables offered in Table 1 with the exception that the 1962 Guido caretaker regime is reclassified as a civilian rather than a military regime. This was done not so much in recognition of the heterogeneous composition of that regime but in order to test the sensitivity of the data to such shifts and to determine how stable the pattern of budgetary distributions was over time. The reclassification produced no statistically significant alterations in our results.
4. All data in this section is taken from the Presupuesto General de la Nación for the years cited. References in the text refer to specific years.

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APPENDIX A

TABLE 1

Argentina: Political Dummy Variables, 1961-1982

Weight of Civilian-Military Regimes								
Year	Dump	DumpA	DumpB	DumpC	DumpD	DumpE	DumpF	DumpG
1961	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
1962	0	1	1	2	2	2	1	3
1963	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
1964	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
1965	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
1966	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	3
1967	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	3
1968	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	3
1969	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	3
1970	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	3
1971	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	3
1972	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	3
1973	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0
1974	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0
1975	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0
1976	2	4	1	2	2	3	2	2
1977	2	4	1	2	2	3	2	2
1978	2	4	1	2	2	3	2	2
1979	2	4	1	2	2	3	2	2
1980	2	4	1	2	2	3	2	2
1981	2	4	1	2	2	3	2	2
1982	2	4	1	2	2	3	2	2

NOTE: 1961, 63-65 Civilian regimes
 1962, Military regime
 1966-72 Military regime
 1973-75 Peronist regime
 1976-82 Military regime

Regime tenures rounded out to start of year for statistical purposes.

Source for data on central administrative expenditures: World Bank, Argentina: Economic Memorandum, Vol. 2; Statistical Appendix, Washington: The World Bank, 1985; p. 333.

APPENDIX A (Continued)

TABLE 2

Argentina: Impact of Political Change on Budgetary Allocations
1963-1982

Statistics				Statistics			
t-		r²		t-		r²	
Statistic	Dv	Statistic	Dv	Statistic	Dv	Statistic	Dv
<u>General Administration</u>							
<u>Political Variable</u>				<u>Domestic Security</u>			
DumpA	-3.13	0.366	2.07	DumpA	-2.03	0.195	1.56
DumpB	-1.60	0.131	2.03	DumpB	-1.83	0.164	1.47
DumpC	-1.52	0.121	2.33	DumpC	-2.02	0.193	1.54
DumpD	-1.54	0.122	2.36	DumpD	-1.83	0.166	1.46
DumpE	-1.89	0.174	2.06	DumpE	-1.85	0.169	1.46
DumpF	-2.29	0.231	2.06	DumpF	-1.86	0.170	1.47
DumpG	-1.51	0.119	2.31	DumpG	-1.78	0.158	1.45
<u>Defense</u>				<u>Total Social Expenditures</u>			
DumpA	0.57	0.019	1.17	DumpA	-0.31	0.01	1.68
DumpB	2.65	0.287	1.61	DumpB	-2.00	0.184	1.78
DumpC	2.15	0.214	1.47	DumpC	-1.20	0.07	1.73
DumpD	2.91	0.293	1.61	DumpD	-2.48	0.266	1.87
DumpE	2.48	0.266	1.66	DumpE	-2.77	0.311	1.89
DumpF	2.12	0.213	1.60	DumpF	-3.11	0.363	1.93
DumpG	2.77	0.311	1.58	DumpG	-2.00	0.191	1.90

Statistics				Statistics			
t-		r²		t-		r²	
Statistic	Dv			Statistic	Dv		
<u>Social Security</u>							
Political Variable				Political Variable			
DumpA	-3.37	0.400	1.70	DumpA	1.64	0.136	1.55
DumpB	-2.44	0.260	1.67	DumpB	0.006	0.001	1.60
DumpC	-1.50	0.117	1.70	DumpC	0.25	0.004	1.59
DumpD	-3.16	0.370	1.65	DumpD	-0.19	0.002	1.60
DumpE	-3.72	0.449	1.57	DumpE	0.21	0.002	1.60
DumpF	-4.37	0.529	1.74	DumpF	0.39	0.009	1.56
DumpG	-2.27	0.233	1.69	DumpG	-0.49	0.014	1.61
<u>Housing</u>							
DumpA	-0.15	0.001	1.99	DumpA	-0.07	-0.001	2.02
DumpB	-0.47	0.012	2.25	DumpB	-2.13	0.271	2.18
DumpC	-0.60	0.021	2.46	DumpC	-1.11	0.067	2.14
DumpD	-0.32	0.006	2.35	DumpD	-4.12	0.500	1.97
DumpE	-0.24	0.003	1.88	DumpE	-5.11	0.605	1.90
DumpF	-0.08	0.001	1.93	DumpF	-5.02	0.597	1.98
DumpG	-0.52	0.015	2.16	DumpG	-1.71	0.147	2.22

Table 2 (Continued)

Statistics				Statistics			
t-Statistic		r ²	Dw	t-Statistic		r ²	Dw
<u>her Social Expenditures</u>							
<u>Transportation</u>				<u>Political Variable</u>			
DumpA	-0.92	0.048	2.07	DumpA	-0.01	0.001	1.69
DumpB	-1.38	0.101	2.27	DumpB	2.14	0.213	1.58
DumpC	-0.97	0.052	2.21	DumpC	1.49	0.116	1.65
DumpD	-1.61	0.133	2.29	DumpD	2.55	0.277	1.52
DumpE	-1.89	0.173	2.29	DumpE	2.79	0.313	1.58
DumpF	-2.14	0.212	2.24	DumpF	2.90	0.331	1.65
DumpG	-1.33	0.095	2.24	DumpG	2.11	0.208	1.53
<u>Real Economic Development</u>				<u>Agriculture</u>			
DumpA	0.70	0.028	2.17	DumpA	-2.81	0.137	2.15
DumpB	2.28	0.236	2.19	DumpB	-0.80	0.036	2.33
DumpC	1.68	0.143	2.20	DumpC	-0.32	0.002	2.51
DumpD	2.60	0.285	2.17	DumpD	-1.15	0.072	2.21
DumpE	2.97	0.342	2.18	DumpE	-1.60	0.132	2.03
DumpF	3.16	0.370	2.15	DumpF	-2.13	0.210	1.88
DumpG	2.17	0.217	2.14	DumpG	-0.58	0.038	2.42

	Statistics		Statistics	
	t-Statistic	r ²	t-Statistic	r ²
<u>Other Economic Development</u>				
<u>Political Variable</u>				
DumpA	0.663	0.025	1.76	
DumpB	2.11	0.207	2.18	
DumpC	1.88	0.173	2.09	
DumpD	2.12	0.210	2.28	
DumpE	1.99	0.189	2.08	
DumpF	1.69	0.144	2.00	
DumpG	2.11	0.208	2.25	

Source for data on central administrative expenditures: World Bank, Argentina: Economic Memorandum, Vol. 2; Statistical Appendix, Washington: The World Bank, 1985; p. 333.

APPENDIX A

TABLE 3

Argentina: Impact of Political Change on Budgetary Allocations, 1961-1975

() = t statistic

	Statistics				Statistics			
	RHO	r ²	F	DW	RHO	r ²	F	DW
<u>Share of Defense</u>								
<u>Political Variable</u>								
DUMP (-3.81)	(1.34)	0.547	14.53	1.99	DUMP (-0.53)	(-0.13)	0.023	0.28
DUMPA (-2.37)	(1.74)	0.320	5.65	1.74	DUMPA (-0.01)	(0.02)	0.001	0.01
DUMPB (1.95)	(4.63)	0.241	3.81	1.97	DUMPB (1.36)	(-0.84)	0.13	1.85
DUMPC (1.58)	(5.22)	0.172	2.51	1.82	DUMPC (1.16)	(-0.77)	0.100	1.34
DUMPD (2.29)	(3.42)	0.305	5.26	2.07	DUMPD (1.10)	(-0.59)	0.093	1.23
DUMPE (2.29)	(3.42)	0.305	5.26	2.07	DUMPE (1.10)	(-0.59)	0.093	1.23
DUMPF (3.81)	(1.34)	0.547	14.53	1.99	DUMPF (0.53)	(-0.131)	0.023	0.28
DUMPG (2.15)	(3.98)	0.278	4.63	2.04	DUMPG (1.25)	(-0.73)	0.116	1.57
								1.93

Share of Administration
Political Variable

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Statistics						Statistics					
		RHO	r ²	F	DW			RHO	r ²	F	DW
Share of Domestic Security											
<u>Political Variable</u>											
DUMP	(-0.94)	(0.67)	0.067	0.87	1.70	DUMP	(2.58)	(0.34)	0.358	6.69	2.39
DUMPA	(-0.70)	(0.93)	0.039	0.49	1.68	DUMPA	(2.59)	(0.01)	0.358	6.71	2.25
DUMPB	(0.45)	(0.80)	0.016	0.20	1.52	DUMPB	(-1.03)	(1.35)	0.082	1.08	2.46
DUMPC	(0.03)	(0.99)	0.008	0.01	1.50	DUMPC	(-1.65)	(1.03)	1.86	2.75	2.47
DUMPD	(0.83)	(0.61)	0.055	0.70	1.61	DUMPD	(-1.65)	(1.03)	1.86	2.75	2.47
DUMPE	(0.83)	(0.61)	0.055	0.70	1.61	DUMPE	(-1.65)	(1.03)	0.186	2.75	2.47
DUMPF	(0.93)	(0.67)	0.067	0.82	1.70	DUMPF	(-2.58)	(0.347)	0.358	6.69	2.39
DUMPG	(0.71)	(0.66)	0.041	0.50	1.57	DUMPG	(-1.41)	(1.91)	0.143	2.01	2.47
Share of Social Services											
<u>Political Variable</u>											

APPENDIX A

TABLE 3 (Continued)

	Statistics				Statistics			
	RHO	r ²	F	DW	RHO	r ²	F	DW
<u>Share of Education</u>								
<u>Political Variable</u>								
DUMP (0.038)	(2.06)	0.001	0.001	1.98	DUMP (-9.44)	(-1.76)	0.881	89.20
DUMPA (-0.30)	(2.10)	0.076	0.092	2.13	DUMPA (-0.62)	(11.81)	0.031	0.38
DUMPB (-0.51)	(2.23)	0.021	0.026	1.95	DUMPB (-0.58)	(13.93)	0.028	0.34
DUMPC (-0.64)	(2.28)	0.033	0.415	2.05	DUMPC (-0.96)	(0.01)	0.071	0.92
DUMPD (-0.29)	(2.10)	0.007	0.088	1.92	DUMPD (-0.37)	(13.28)	0.011	0.14
DUMPE (-0.29)	(2.10)	0.007	0.088	1.92	DUMPE (-0.37)	(13.28)	0.01	0.14
DUMPF (-0.03)	(2.00)	0.001	0.001	1.99	DUMPF (9.44)	(-1.76)	0.881	87.20
DUMPG (-0.39)	(2.18)	0.012	0.152	1.92	DUMPG (-0.46)	(13.58)	0.017	0.21

APPENDIX A

TABLE 3 (Continued)

	Statistics				Statistics			
	RHO	r ²	F	DW	RHO	r ²	F	DW
<u>Share of Social Security</u>								
<u>Political Variable</u>								
<u>DUMP</u> (1.45)	(0.57)	0.151	2.13	1.88	<u>DUMP</u> (6.04)	(-0.51)	0.752	36.57
<u>DUMPA</u> (1.11)	(1.03)	0.095	1.25	1.86	<u>DUMPA</u> (-0.34)	(12.74)	0.009	0.11
<u>DUMPB</u> (-0.78)	(0.64)	0.049	0.61	1.83	<u>DUMPB</u> (0.09)	(12.35)	0.006	0.08
<u>DUMPC</u> (-0.18)	(0.89)	0.003	0.04	1.80	<u>DUMPC</u> (0.05)	(0.01)	0.003	0.01
<u>DUMPD</u> (-1.30)	(0.43)	0.123	1.69	1.88	<u>DUMPD</u> (0.19)	(13.06)	0.003	0.04
<u>DUMPE</u> (-1.30)	(0.43)	0.123	1.69	1.88	<u>DUMPE</u> (0.19)	(13.06)	0.003	0.04
<u>DUMPF</u> (-1.45)	(0.57)	0.150	2.13	1.88	<u>DUMPF</u> (-6.04)	(-0.51)	0.752	36.57
<u>DUMPG</u> (-1.13)	(0.48)	0.096	1.28	1.86	<u>DUMPG</u> (0.16)	(12.89)	0.002	0.025
								2.10

Share of Other Social Expenditures
Political Variable

APPENDIX A

TABLE 3 (Continued)

		Statistics				Statistics			
		RHO	r ²	F	DW	RHO	r ²	F	DW
<u>Share of Housing</u>									
<u>Political Variable</u>									
<u>DUMP</u>									
(5.71)		(-0.98)	0.731	32.62	1.99				
<u>DUMPA</u>									
(1.94)		(1.16)	0.239	3.78	1.88				
<u>DUMPB</u>									
(-1.87)		(1.56)	0.226	3.51	1.96				
<u>DUMPC</u>									
(-0.96)		(2.04)	0.072	0.93	1.91				
<u>DUMPD</u>									
(-3.61)		(0.22)	0.521	13.08	1.96				
<u>DUMPE</u>									
(-3.61)		(0.22)	0.521	13.08	1.96				
<u>DUMPF</u>									
(-5.71)		(-0.99)	0.731	32.62	1.99				
<u>DUMPG</u>									
(-2.73)		(0.86)	0.384	7.48	1.96				
<u>Share of Economic Development</u>									
<u>Political Variable</u>									
<u>DUMP</u>									
(-5.41)		(-0.01)	0.710	29.33	1.87				
<u>DUMPA</u>									
(-3.09)		(0.63)	0.444	9.59	1.28				
<u>DUMPB</u>									
(1.60)		(2.79)	0.176	12.57	1.76				
<u>DUMPC</u>									
(1.02)		(3.57)	0.081	1.05	1.78				
<u>DUMPD</u>									
(2.61)		(1.67)	0.362	6.83	1.73				
<u>DUMPE</u>									
(2.61)		(1.67)	0.362	6.83	1.73				
<u>DUMPF</u>									
(5.41)		(-0.01)	0.710	29.33	1.87				
<u>DUMPG</u>									
(2.13)		(2.15)	0.225	4.55	1.74				

Note: Regressions made using Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to correct for serial correlation.

APPENDIX A

TABLE 4

Argentina: Impact of Political Change on Budgetary Allocations, 1966-1982

		Statistics				Statistics			
		RHO	r^2	F	DW	RHO	r^2	F	DW
<u>Share of Housing</u>									
<u>Political Variable</u>									
<u>DUMP</u>	(0.04)	(2.58)	0.001	0.01	2.02				
<u>DUMPA</u>	(0.04)	(2.58)	0.001	0.01	2.02				
<u>DUMPB</u>	(-4.68)	(-0.67)	0.610	21.93	1.91				
<u>DUMPC</u>	(-4.68)	(-0.67)	0.610	21.93	1.91				
<u>DUMPD</u>	(-4.68)	(-0.67)	0.610	21.93	1.91				
<u>DUMPE</u>	(-7.00)	(-1.85)	0.778	49.11	1.96				
<u>DUMPF</u>	(-4.83)	(-0.76)	0.625	23.42	1.91				
<u>DUMPG</u>	(-1.75)	(1.66)	0.180	3.08	2.26				
<u>Share of Economic Development</u>									
<u>Political Variable</u>									
<u>DUMP</u>	(-3.51)	(0.87)	0.468	12.34	1.77				
<u>DUMPA</u>	(-3.51)	(0.87)	0.468	12.34	1.77				
<u>DUMPB</u>	(2.50)	(7.72)	0.310	6.29	2.03				
<u>DUMPC</u>	(2.50)	(7.72)	0.310	6.29	2.03				
<u>DUMPD</u>	(2.50)	(7.72)	0.310	6.29	2.03				
<u>DUMPE</u>	(2.85)	(10.22)	0.367	8.14	2.05				
<u>DUMPF</u>	(3.00)	(11.41)	0.391	8.99	2.04				
<u>DUMPG</u>	(2.16)	(5.60)	0.250	4.68	1.98				

NOTE: Regressions made using Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to correct for serial correlation.

APPENDIX A

TABLE 4 (Continued)

		Statistics				Statistics					
		RHO	r ²	F	DW	RHO	r ²	F	DW		
<u>Share of Defense</u>						<u>Share of Administration</u>					
<u>Political Variable</u>						<u>Political Variable</u>					
<u>DUMP</u>	(0.02)	(3.45)	0.001	0.01	1.14	<u>DUMP</u>	(-6.19)	(-1.04)	0.732	38.37	1.84
<u>DUMPA</u>	(0.02)	(3.45)	0.001	0.01	1.14	<u>DUMPA</u>	(-6.19)	(-1.04)	0.732	38.37	1.84
<u>DUMPB</u>	(2.81)	(1.48)	0.362	7.94	1.54	<u>DUMPB</u>	(-1.52)	(4.02)	0.142	2.33	2.31
<u>DUMPC</u>	(2.81)	(1.48)	0.362	7.94	1.54	<u>DUMPC</u>	(-1.52)	(4.02)	0.142	2.33	2.31
<u>DUMPD</u>	(2.81)	(1.48)	0.362	7.94	1.54	<u>DUMPD</u>	(-1.52)	(4.02)	0.142	2.33	2.31
<u>DUMPE</u>	(2.14)	(3.40)	0.247	4.60	1.65	<u>DUMPE</u>	(-1.65)	(3.03)	0.163	2.74	2.24
<u>DUMPF</u>	(2.06)	(4.53)	0.231	4.27	1.71	<u>DUMPF</u>	(-2.12)	(2.06)	0.244	4.52	2.08
<u>DUMPG</u>	(2.52)	(1.98)	0.313	6.38	1.55	<u>DUMPG</u>	(-1.62)	(5.36)	1.59	2.65	2.34

APPENDIX A

TABLE 4 (Continued)

		Statistics				Statistics			
		RHO	r ²	F	DW	RHO	r ²	F	DW
<u>Share of Domestic Security</u>									
<u>Political Variable</u>									
<u>DUMP</u>	(0.31)	(0.89)	0.007	0.10	1.34	<u>DUMP</u>	(-2.02)	0.227	1.53
<u>DUMPA</u>	(0.31)	(0.89)	0.007	0.10	1.34	<u>DUMPA</u>	(-2.02)	0.227	1.53
<u>DUMPB</u>	(0.80)	(0.36)	0.044	0.63	1.45	<u>DUMPB</u>	(-2.68)	0.339	1.97
<u>DUMPC</u>	(0.80)	(0.36)	0.044	0.63	1.45	<u>DUMPC</u>	(-2.68)	0.379	1.97
<u>DUMPD</u>	(0.80)	(0.36)	0.044	0.63	1.45	<u>DUMPD</u>	(-2.68)	0.339	1.97
<u>DUMPE</u>	(0.95)	(0.19)	0.061	0.91	1.45	<u>DUMPE</u>	(-2.83)	0.365	1.96
<u>DUMPF</u>	(0.90)	(0.28)	0.054	0.80	1.43	<u>DUMPF</u>	(-2.92)	0.379	1.91
<u>DUMPG</u>	(0.48)	(0.70)	0.016	0.23	1.40	<u>DUMPG</u>	(-2.44)	0.300	1.99
<u>Share of Social Services</u>									
<u>Political Variable</u>									
<u>DUMP</u>	(-3.14)	(-3.14)	0.227	4.11	1.53	<u>DUMP</u>	(-3.14)	0.227	1.53
<u>DUMPA</u>	(-3.14)	(-3.14)	0.227	4.11	1.53	<u>DUMPA</u>	(-3.14)	0.227	1.53
<u>DUMPB</u>	(12.18)	(12.18)	0.339	7.19	1.97	<u>DUMPB</u>	(12.18)	0.339	1.97
<u>DUMPC</u>	(12.18)	(12.18)	0.379	7.19	1.97	<u>DUMPC</u>	(12.18)	0.379	1.97
<u>DUMPD</u>	(12.18)	(12.18)	0.339	7.19	1.97	<u>DUMPD</u>	(12.18)	0.339	1.97
<u>DUMPE</u>	(9.22)	(9.22)	0.365	8.04	1.96	<u>DUMPE</u>	(9.22)	0.365	1.96
<u>DUMPF</u>	(6.90)	(6.90)	0.379	8.54	1.91	<u>DUMPF</u>	(6.90)	0.379	1.91
<u>DUMPG</u>	(17.55)	(17.55)	0.300	5.98	1.99	<u>DUMPG</u>	(17.55)	0.300	1.99

TABLE 4 (Continued)

Statistics					Statistics						
RHO			r^2	F	DW	RHO			r^2	F	DW
<u>Share of Education</u>						<u>Share of Health</u>					
<u>Political Variable</u>						<u>Political Variable</u>					
<u>DUMP</u> (-5.06)	(1.50)	0.647	25.68	1.50		<u>DUMP</u> (-6.49)	(1.34)	0.759	44.21	1.81	
<u>DUMPA</u> (-5.06)	(1.50)	0.647	25.68	1.50		<u>DUMPA</u> (-6.49)	(1.34)	0.759	44.21	1.81	
<u>DUMPB</u> (-3.66)	(23.29)	0.490	13.45	1.74		<u>DUMPB</u> (-0.10)	(0.01)	0.007	0.01	1.95	
<u>DUMPC</u> (-3.66)	(23.29)	0.490	13.45	1.74		<u>DUMPC</u> (-0.10)	(0.01)	0.007	0.01	1.95	
<u>DUMPD</u> (-3.66)	(23.29)	0.490	13.45	1.74		<u>DUMPD</u> (-0.10)	(0.01)	0.007	0.01	1.95	
<u>DUMPE</u> (-4.16)	(10.45)	0.553	17.38	1.56		<u>DUMPE</u> (-0.08)	(14.51)	0.008	0.01	1.46	
<u>DUMPF</u> (-4.43)	(10.08)	0.583	19.64	1.55		<u>DUMPF</u> (-0.06)	(13.60)	0.003	0.01	1.44	
<u>DUMPG</u> (-2.93)	(11.26)	0.380	8.59	1.72		<u>DUMPG</u> (-0.29)	(0.01)	0.006	0.08	1.68	

APPENDIX A

TABLE 4 (Continued)

		Statistics				Statistics			
		RHO	r ²	F	DW	RHO	r ²	F	DW
<u>Share of Social Security Welfare</u>									
<u>Political Variable</u>									
<u>DUMP</u>	(0.10)	0.346	7.42	1.20		<u>DUMP</u>	(6.62)	0.189	3.27
	(2.72)						(-1.80)		1.71
<u>DUMPA</u>	(0.10)	0.346	7.42	1.20		<u>DUMPA</u>	(6.62)	0.189	3.27
	(2.72)						(-1.80)		1.71
<u>DUMPB</u>	(2.05)	0.011	0.16	1.56		<u>DUMPB</u>	(3.07)	0.167	2.22
	(-0.41)						(-1.67)		
<u>DUMPC</u>	(2.05)	0.011	0.16	1.56		<u>DUMPC</u>	(3.07)	0.167	2.22
	(-0.41)						(-1.67)		
<u>DUMPD</u>	(2.05)	0.011	0.16	1.56		<u>DUMPD</u>	(3.07)	0.167	2.22
	(-0.41)						(-1.67)		
<u>DUMPE</u>	(2.01)	0.001	0.01	1.56		<u>DUMPE</u>	(3.96)	0.190	3.28
	(0.04)						(-1.81)		2.25
<u>DUMPF</u>	(1.74)	0.01	0.14	1.56		<u>DUMPF</u>	(4.57)	0.219	3.94
	(0.38)						(-1.98)		2.24
<u>DUMPG</u>	(1.67)	0.05	0.82	1.57		<u>DUMPG</u>	(1.86)	0.240	4.43
	(-0.91)						(-2.10)		2.10


Share of Other Social Expenditures

Political Variable

APPENDIX B

CHART 1


ALLOCATIONS TO ARGENTINE NATIONAL LABOR ADMINISTRATION
AS A PERCENTAGE OF CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE OUTLAYS
1946 — 1982



Allocations in current pesos from General Funds destined for Central Administrative Agencies cited.
Source: Presupuesto General De La Administracion Nacional, for years cited.

CHART 2

ALLOCATIONS TO NATIONAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AS A
PERCENTAGE OF CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE OUTLAYS, 1946-1982



Allocations in current pesos from General Funds destined for Central Administrative Agencies.

Source: Presupuesto General De La Administración Nacional for the years cited.

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